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和 CC-LM 模型分析了资本约束下利率渠道和信贷渠道的作用机制。 
为进一步揭示出资本监管的宏观效应，本文在前文基础上通过在 C-C 模型
的基础上植入信贷风险、存贷比约束和可变的风险权重，再次动态地研究了货币










































Inspirated by the realistic problem that why banking crisises always acommpany 
with the Basel Capital Accord being put into practice in the short time, this paper 
focuses on the complicate relationships between capital regulation, risk taking and the 
transmition mechanism of monetary policy from the banking system. 
Firstly, the paper makes an academic synthesis about literatures of the macro- 
and microeconomic effects of the capital regulation. Secondly, based on the financial 
functional view, the paper answers the logic starting point question what’s special of 
the balance sheet of bank, then clearly pinpoints that as long as the intermediaries 
perform the same financial functions they can be difined the bank or near bank. Then 
the paper investigates thoroughly optimal capital structure of the special financial 
intermediary, analyses accommodation of bank risk taking behavior. In consideration 
of the physical truth of Chinese banking, the paper indicates there is an erroneous 
tendency on excessive risk taking that is endogenous by the multiple effects from 
market competition and soft capital constraint. Thirdly, this paper makes a study on 
what effects capital regulation will impose on bank lending, economic fluctuation and 
transmition mechanism of monetary policy. By extending the IS-LM model and 
CC-LM model, the paper successively analyses the interest rate channel and credit 
channel with the capital constraint. 
However, these two channels can not cover the whole story, so the paper presents 
a dynamic study on the relationships between bank capital, bank loan and economic 
fluctuation once more by introducing loan-to-deposit ratio requirement, credit risk and 
variable risk weight to extend the basic C-C model in the three aspects, that is bank 
capital channel of monetary policy transmition mechanism. Finally, on account of the 
Chinese quarter date in 1996~2009, this paper constructs a five sectors simultaneous 
model including the famliy sector, intermediate goods sector, final goods sector, 
banking sector and monetery authority by introducing banking sector into the 
mainstream macroeconomic analytical framework-DSGE model. The new DSGE 
mode not only takes into account the bank capital requirement, but aslo the risk taking 
requirement, and integrates the interest rate channel, credit channel, bank capital 
channel and risk taking channel. By optimizing behaviours of the different agents, the 
paper presents a comprehensive perspective on the relationship bettwen bank credit 













The academic contributions of this paper can be expressed as follows: (1) the 
paper is the first attempt to study the relationship between capital requirement and 
monetary policy by taking the speciality theory of the banking as the logic starting 
point, then goes deep into the intrinsic quality of the commercial banking and shadow 
banking system. (2)Based on the classical banking corporate governance theory, the 
paper studies bank risk taking under the dynamic optimal capital rate and implicit 
insurance, and particularly points out endogenous excessive risk taking of Chinese 
banking by the multiple effects from market competition and soft capital constraint. 
(3)Afer reviewing the interest rate channel and credit channel, the paper makes a 
depth analysis on bank capital channel and risk taking channel, so as to present a 
further theoretical explaination on the pro-cyclicity of the financial system. (4) With 
the framework of DSGE model, the paper not only takes bank capital into account, 
and aslo the dynamic change of the bank risk taking, so it promulgates complete 
mechanisms and effects of “small shocks, large cycles” in the macroeconomy. 
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